Ensemble is a Group Communication System built at Cornell and the Hebrew universities. It allows processes to create process groups within which scalable reliable fifo-ordered multicast and point-to-point communication are supported. The system also supports other communication properties, such as causal and total multicast ordering, flow control, and the like. This article describes the security protocols and infrastructure of Ensemble. Applications using Ensemble with the extensions described here benefit from strong security properties. Under the assumption that trusted processes will not be corrupted, all communication is secured from tampering by outsiders. Our work extends previous work performed in the Horus system (Ensemble's predecessor) by adding support for multiple partitions, efficient rekeying, and application-defined security policies. Unlike Horus, which used its own security infrastructure with nonstandard key distribution and timing services, Ensemble's security mechanism is based on off-the shelf authentication systems, such as PGP and Kerberos. We extend previous results on group rekeying, with a novel protocol that makes use of diamondlike data structures. Our Diamond protocol allows the removal of untrusted members within milliseconds. In this work we are considering configurations of hundreds of members, and further assume that member trust policies are symmetric and transitive. These assumptions dictate some of our design decisions.
INTRODUCTION
Group Communication Systems (GCSs) are used today in industry where reliability and high availability are required. Group Communication is a subject of ongoing research and many GCSs have been built throughout the world.
1 Example GCS applications include: group-conferencing, distributed simulation, server replication, and more (see Birman [1999] ). In industry, GCSs are mainly used for cluster management. The SP2, and other IBM clustering systems use the Phoenix system [Chiakpo 1996 ], IBM AS/400 clusters use the Clue system [Goft and Lotem 1999] , and Microsoft Wolfpack clusters use Group Communication technology at the core of their system [Vogels et al. 1998 ]. A secure GCS is one protected against malicious behavior or outright attack. This article describes the security architecture of Ensemble [Renesse et al. 1997] , our group communication system, which achieves the desired properties.
Ensemble was developed at Cornell and the Hebrew universities. It is written in a dialect of the ML programming language [Leroy 2001 ] in order to facilitate system verification. The design methodology behind Ensemble stresses modularity and flexibility [Hayden 1998 ]. Thus, Ensemble is divided into many layers, each implementing a simple protocol. Stacking these layers together, much as one uses Lego blocks, users may customize the system to suit their needs.
Ensemble supports the fortress security model. In this model, the "good guys" are protected by a castle from the hordes of barbarians outside. In the context of a GCS this corresponds to a situation where the (honest) group members need this wall to protect them from the adversary. Since the members are distributed across the network, they cannot be protected by a firewall. An alternative vehicle for protection is the use of cryptography. One alternative is to use public keys to encrypt all group messages. However, public-key cryptography is roughly 1000 times slower than symmetric-key cryptography, making it prohibitively expensive. The second alternative, which we have chosen, is to dynamically agree upon and use a shared symmetric key. Assuming all members agree on the same key, all group messages can be MACed 2 and encrypted. If we assume that the adversary has no way of retrieving the group key, the members are protected.
In this work we consider configurations of hundreds of members, and further assume that member trust policies are symmetric and transitive. These assumptions dictate our design decisions.
The group key needs special handling as it can be distributed only to authenticated and authorized group members. This raises two challenges.
A rekeying mechanism: This is the problem of secure replacement of the current group key once it is deemed insecure, or if there is danger that it was leaked to the adversary. Rekeying is challenging since switching to a new key must occur without using the old, possibly compromised, key for dissemination. Naturally, one could use public keys for this task, yet doing so leads to high latency.
If one assumes the simple "primary partition" model, where only a single component of the group may function, then a simple solution is available. In this case it suffices to designate a centralized key-server that will have responsibility for disseminating, revoking, and refreshing group keys. Only group members in contact with the server will have access to the key and hence be capable of functioning.
Our work is the first to support the more general multiple-partition model first suggested in Dolev et al. [1995] . Supporting multiple partitions is more difficult since one cannot rely on any centralized service.
Secure key agreement in a group: This is the problem of providing a protocol whereby secure agreement can be reached among group members who need to select a mutual key. Such a protocol should not restrict the Ensemble protocol stack; that is, all previously legal combinations of layers should still be possible, it should be unobtrusive, and support multiple partitions. That is, the protocol should "compose" cleanly with Ensemble stacks, regardless of their 2unctionality.
Our protocol must efficiently handle the case where two group components merge after a network partitioning, where the network partitions into two or more components, and the resulting group components use different keys. A simple approach (taken, for example, in Wong et al. [1998] ) is to add members one by one, in effect transferring them from the smaller group to the larger one. However, this is potentially slow since members are added one at a time; it incurs cost quadratic in the number of added members: O(n) members × join protocol (which is also O(n)). Our solution is much more efficient.
We focus on benign failures and assume that authenticated members will not be corrupted. Byzantine fault-tolerant systems have been built by other researchers [Reiter 1994; Kihlstrom et al. 1998 ], but suffer from limited performance since they use costly protocols and make extensive use of public-key cryptography. We believe that our failure model is sufficient for the needs of most practical applications. As demonstrated in the performance section, our system has good performance and scalability.
Our contributions are as follows.
-We demonstrate how security properties can be decomposed and introduced to a layered protocol architecture. -We support security properties for multiple partitions. Earlier work either does not address the issue of group partition or only supports security semantics for the primary partition [Renesse et al. 1996 ]. -We provide support for dynamic application-defined authorization policies.
-We use a novel algorithm that allows removing untrusted members in a matter of milliseconds.
Our security architecture is composable with most other Ensemble layers. The user thus has the freedom to combine layers and properties including security. Note that some protocols, such as the bimodal multicast , may be more difficult to support.
MODEL
Consider a universe that consists of a finite group U of n processes. Processes communicate with each other by passing messages through a network of channels. The system is asynchronous: clock drifts are unbounded and messages may be arbitrarily delayed or lost in the network. Processes may crash and later restart.
To model both network and process failures, we use the partitioning model. Sets of processes may become partitioned from each other. A partition occurs when U is split into a set {P 1 , . . . , P k } of disjoint subgroups. Each process in P i can communicate only with other processes in P i . The subsets P i are sometimes called network-components. We consider an extended dynamic partitions model [Dolev et al. 1995] , wherein network-components dynamically merge and split. A process crash can be modeled as a partition, and a restart can be modeled as a merge; hence, in our algorithms we mainly consider partition and merge scenarios.
As described earlier a GCS creates process groups in which reliable ordered multicast and point-to-point messaging are supported. Processes may dynamically join and leave a group. Groups may dynamically partition into many components due to network failures/partitions; when network partitions are healed group components remerge through the GCS protocols. Information about groups is provided to group members in the form of view notifications. For a particular process p a view contains the list of processes currently alive and connected to p, ordered lexicographically. In a distributed asynchronous system, it is not possible to provide accurate views, therefore, the notifications provided to processes can only be an approximation of the actual set of connected processes. Under "normal" network conditions, the view reflects the actual network connectivity, under heavy load, and link fluctuations; the view is a mere approximation. When a membership change occurs due to a partition or a group merge, the GCS goes through a (short) phase of reconfiguration. It then delivers a new view to the applications reflecting the (new) set of connected members.
In what follows p, q, and s denote Ensemble processes and V , V 1 , V 2 denote views. The generic group is denoted by G. G's members are numbered from p 1 to p n .
For this article, we focus on messages delivered in the order they were sent: a "fifo" or "sender-ordered" delivery property.
Ensemble follows the virtual synchrony (VS) model. This model describes the relative ordering of message deliveries and view notifications. It is useful in simplifying complex failure and message loss scenarios that may occur in distributed environments. For example, a system adhering to VS ensures "atomic failure." If process q in view V fails then all the members in V \{q} observe this event at the "same time." To achieve fault-tolerance, GCSs require all members to actively participate in failure-detection, membership, flow-control, and reliability protocols. Such protocol implementations have inherently limited scalability. We have managed to scale Ensemble to a few hundred members per group, but no more. For a detailed study of this problem, the interested reader is referred to Birman et al. [1999] and Birman [1999] . For example, reliable fifo in the virtual synchrony model requires all members to buffer each other's messages until they are known to be stable (delivered at all destinations). This requirement prohibits scaling to large groups. In this article, we do not discuss configurations of more than a hundred members.
We assume that the processes in a group have access to trusted authentication and authorization services, as well as to a local key-generation facility. The authentication system itself can be centralized (e.g., Neuman and Ts'o [1994] ) or distributed (e.g., Zimmermann [2000] ). We also assume that the authentication service allows processes to sign messages. This means that process p can send an authenticated message M to process q, and q can verify that M has been signed by p. Furthermore, no attacker can modify M without damaging the signature. To denote that message M has been signed by member p for member q we write [M ] S pq . In particular only q can verify this message. This requirement allows us to use systems such as Kerberos which create certificates that are good only for point-to-point communication.
The adversary has access to all untrusted (potentially dishonest) machines and may corrupt or eavesdrop on any packet traveling through the network. Our goal is to protect messages sent between trusted members of U. We do not provide protection against denial of service or traffic analysis attacks. Rather, we restrict ourselves to the authenticity and secrecy of message content. We work with an existing operating system and assume its security and correctness. An OS vulnerability or a compromised authentication service would cause a breach in Ensemble security.
Each member decides on its own trust policy (more on this in Section 3). Ensemble is responsible for enforcing this trust policy, making sure that only mutually trusting members enter the same group component. Note that G may now be split into network components, and further into mutually distrusting subcomponents.
The system should support forward confidentiality (FCY) with respect to the group key. Briefly, this means that past members cannot obtain keys used in the future. The dual requirement that current members cannot obtain keys used in the past is termed backward confidentiality (BCY). Compromising long-term secrets should not reveal group keys (Perfect Forward Secrecy).
To support FCY, the group key must be switched every time members join and leave. This may incur high cost, therefore, we attempt to relax FCY without breaking security. Other researchers have also noted that rekeying is a costly operation, and have tried to perform periodic rekeying [Setia et al. 2000; Mukkamalla and Katz 1999] , or to tie it with the access control list (ACL) mechanisms [McDaniel et al. 1999 ]. Our approach is three pronged:
-fast rekeying algorithms are included in the system; -the system rekeys itself once every 24 hours, to prevent cryptanalysis; and -apart from the above, rekeying is a user-initiated action. The user should decide when to switch the group key, trading off security against performance.
The default lifetime of session and group keys is 24 hours, the maximum suggested by the Photuris [Karn and Simpson 1995] protocol. For stronger security the user may shorten key lifetime. Applications specify the list of trusted members to the system (see more on this in Section 3.1), in the form of an ACL which is treated as replicated data within the group. Ensemble allows any trusted member into a group without rekeying. Members may change the group ACL at run-time, for example, by multicasting totally ordered updates to it, state-machine style (e.g., Schneider [1986] , and Friedman and Vaysburd [1997] ). An ACL can become more restrictive, corresponding to the removal of present group members. First, such members are removed from the group, and then, a rekey operation is performed. During the intervening period, an untrusted member still holds group keys and hence may represent a security breach. We assume that such a process does not leak information.
To explain our intuition, examine a meeting of military staff that have support from civilian advisors. During the low-security part of the meeting, lowsecurity information is revealed to the advisors. Later, the meeting is declared classified, civilians leave the room, and the military staff continue the meeting using high-security information. Until the civilians have left, high-security information is not revealed.
In a group setting, the initial ACL G 1 includes both military personnel and civilians, and all group information is encrypted in key K 1 . Later, the ACL is changed to G 2 , including only military personnel. Civilians leave the room, and the group is rekeyed to key K 2 . The rest of the meeting, now classified, is encrypted with K 2 . The civilians are trusted to behave according to group protocols while they are in the group, and to leave the group when ordered to do so. They are also expected not to reveal information encrypted with K 1 to members outside G 1 .
To summarize, (1) Ensemble does not rekey itself, but leaves it up to the user to decide when to rekey, normally as part of an ACL management policy.
(2) Fast rekey protocols are implemented. (3) Rekeying is not performed when trusted members join.
ENSEMBLE
Ensemble is a GCS supporting process groups as described above. In addition to reliable fifo-ordered multicast and point-to-point communication, it also supports many other protocols and communication properties such as: multicast total order, multicast flow control, protocol switching on the fly, several forms of failure detection, and more (see Renesse et al. [1997] for more details).
Ensemble is typically configured as a user-level library linked to the application. It is divided into many layers, each implementing a simple protocol. Applications may customize the Ensemble library to use the set of layers they Routers * On the left is the default stack that includes an application interface, the membership algorithm, and a reliable-fifo module. The secure stack, to the right, includes all the regular layers (shown in pale gray) and also the Exchange, Rekey, SecChan, and Encrypt layers. The critical path for application messages is between Appl intf and Bottom.
require: the set of layers desired is composed into an Ensemble stack. All members in a group must have the same stack to communicate.
Ensemble keeps view-state information. This information is replicated for all group members and includes data such as: current protocol stack in use, group member names and addresses, the number of members, the group key, and so on. In order to change any of this information, a new view has to be installed, under control of a view agreement protocol.
In Ensemble, each view has a unique leader known to all view members. The leader is selected automatically by ranking group members, and the VS model ensures that, in a given view, all members have a consistent belief concerning which member is the leader.
If the group key needs to be changed the group will be prompted for a view change. During the process the leader will broadcast the new view-state, which includes the new group key. All members will then begin to use the new group key in the upcoming view.
Ensemble divides messages into two classes. There are intragroup or regular messages sent between members of a view. These are usually applicationgenerated messages, although some may also be generated as part of the Ensemble protocols on behalf of the application. In addition, there are intercomponent messages or so-called gossip messages. These are messages generated by Ensemble for communication between separate components of a partitioned Ensemble group. Recall that Ensemble is designed to detect partitioning and to merge partitioned groups when network connectivity is restored. To this end, Ensemble periodically multicasts a gossip message to U, to anyone who can hear. Normally, communication is not possible between separate group components due to network partitions. Reception of a gossip message thus triggers the components' merge protocol, whereby separate components are fused. Ensemble protocols that use gossip messages make very few assumptions about them: they may be lost, reordered, or be received multiple times.
The regular and secure Ensemble stacks are depicted in Table I . The Top and Bottom layers cap the stack from both sides. The Group Membership Protocol (GMP) layer 3 computes the current set of live and connected machines. The Appl intf layer interfaces with the application and provides reliable send and receive capabilities for point-to-point and multicast messages. It is situated in the middle of the stack to allow lower latency to user send/receive operations. The RFifo layer provides reliable per-source fifo messaging.
The Exchange layer guarantees secure key agreement throughout the group. Through it, all members obtain the same symmetric key for encryption and signature. The Rekey layer performs group rekeying upon demand. At the time of this writing, four different rekeying layers are implemented; see Section 5 for more details on the diamond algorithm. The SecChan layer provides a secure point-to-point messaging service to Rekey. These three layers manage the group key within the view-state and hence are regarded as GMP extensions. Furthermore, these layers are not on the message critical path. Normally, they are dormant; they become active either when the user asks for a rekey or when components merge. The Encrypt layer encrypts all user messages. It is on the message critical path, situated below the Appl intf layer.
Policies
The user may specify a security policy for an application. The policy specifies for each address 4 whether that address is trusted. 5 Each application maintains its own policy, and it is up to Ensemble to enforce it and to allow only mutually trusted members into the same component.
A security policy can also be viewed as a list of trusted addresses, or an access control list (ACL). We use this notation interchangeably.
As we show in Section 4, due to efficiency considerations, members should use trust policies that are symmetric and transitive. Other types of policies are currently not supported under Ensemble. When a member changes its security policy, it requests Ensemble to rekey. During the rekey members that are no longer trusted will be excluded and a new key will be chosen for the component. Thus, old untrusted members will not be able to eavesdrop on the group conversations.
Cryptographic Infrastructure
Our design supports the use of a variety of authentication, signature, and encryption mechanisms. By default the system uses PGP for authentication, MD5 [Rivest 1992] for MACing, and RC4 [Thayer and Kaukonen 1997] for encryption. Because these three functionalities are carried out independently any combination of supported authentication, MAC, and encryption systems can be used.
3 Some "layers," as discussed here, are actually sets of layers in the implementation. Also, some layer names have been changed for clarity of exposition. 4 An Ensemble address is comprised of a set of identifiers, for example, an IP address and a PGP principal name. Generally, an address includes an identifier for each communication medium the endpoint is using {UDP,TCP,MPI,ATM, . . .}. 5 We show later, in Section 4 how the authenticity of members' addresses is ensured.
Insofar as freeware cryptographic libraries are available, we preferred to interface with them, rather than coding our own implementations of the various MAC, encryption, and authentication algorithms. As cryptographic standards and algorithms progress and evolve, this permits us to easily keep pace. Currently, an interface with OpenSSL [Cox et al. 2000 ] allows using RC4, DES [US Government 1977] , IDEA [Lai et al. 1991] , and Diffie-Hellman [Diffie and Hellman 1976] . For authentication, in addition to PGP [Zimmermann 2000 ], we have a Kerberos [Neuman and Ts'o 1994] interface, although it is out of date.
Random Number Generation
Cryptographically secure random numbers are vital to any secure system. It is not possible to generate truly random numbers and therefore one uses pseudorandom number generators. We have plugged in an off-the-shelf, cryptographically strong, random number generator to our system [Jenkins 1996 ].
The Group Key
The group key is split into two separate 16-byte subkeys, one used for keyed hashing, and the other for encryption. The MAC router (see below) uses the hashing subkey, while the Encrypt layer (see below) uses the encryption subkey.
Splitting the group key into two subkeys increases security. The encryption and hashing methods known today are not perfect, and none have rigorously been proven secure, hence all have weaknesses, some of which are known. Had, we used a single key for both functionalities, the attacker would have been able to exploit weaknesses from both systems to break the key. Using a different key for each system forces the attacker to break one of the systems without "help" from the other, a task considered very difficult today.
The MAC Router
We first describe the simplest part of the security architecture: the MAC router module. Ensemble routers reside at the bottom of each protocol stack, as seen in Table I .
In Ensemble, the router is the module responsible for getting messages from member p to some set of members {q 1 , . . . , q k }. Routers use transport-level protocols such as MPI, UDP, TCP, and IP-multicast to send and receive messages. An Ensemble application may use several stacks, all sharing a single router. Hence, routers need to decide through which transport to send a message, and when one is received, to which protocol stack to deliver it.
We have modified the normal router to create a MAC router which is used when the application requests a secure protocol stack. The MAC router uses a cryptographically secure one-way hash function, MD5, to hash the message content. MD5 is keyed with the current group key such that the adversary will not be able to forge messages. We are using the standard HMAC algorithm [Krawczyk et al. 1997] . The router at the sender calculates the keyed hash of M -H(M ). Then it sends H(M ) concatenated to the clear-text message M . On receipt, H(M ) is recalculated from M with the receiver's key and compared with the received hash value. If there is a match, the message has been verified.
All outgoing messages are MACed using the group key. Regular messages may be verified by other group members since they all share the group key. Gossip messages are problematic since, initially, different components do not share the same group key. Hence, they are protected using the authentication service.
When message m arrives at a MAC router, belonging to group component A, the router attempts to verify m using the group key. There are several cases: -m is a regular message:
1. Correct hash. Pass up the stack. Message m was sent by a group member in A. 2. Incorrect hash. Drop. Message m may come from a different group component that shares no key with A. It may also be a message sent by an attacker (that does not know the key).
-m is a gossip message: 1. Correct hash. Pass up the stack. Message m is of gossip type, it was sent by a member of a different component that shares the same group key. 2. Incorrect hash. Mark as insecure and pass up the stack. This is a message from a different component B that is signed with B's group key. We ignore the keyed MD5 signature, since we cannot verify it. Possibly, the inner message is signed by the authentication service. The Exchange layer will attempt to verify it; if successful, it will process m's contents. Exchange is the only layer that examines such messages, while other protocol layers that use gossip messages ignore insecure gossip messages.
To summarize, the MAC router attempts to authenticate all messages. Regular unauthenticated messages are dropped; gossip unauthenticated messages are still delivered but marked insecure.
The Encrypt Layer
Ensemble optionally supports user message privacy. The Encrypt layer encrypts/decrypts all user messages with the group key. Note that only the encryption subkey is used. User messages are reliably delivered in fifo (sender) order allowing use of chained encryption.
6 Ensemble messages are MACed, but not encrypted. Such messages do not contain any secret user information and their encryption would only degrade performance. To improve performance, upon a view change we create all security-related data structures and henceforth use them while the view remains current.
The SecChan Layer
The SecChan layer provides a secure channel abstraction. A secure channel allows two members to exchange private information. The layer maintains a cache of secure channels that is updated on demand. SecChan allows layers above it to send private point-to-point messages to other members.
When member p's SecChan layer receives a private message m to be passed to member q then the cache is queried. If a secure channel to q with key K pq already exists then m is encrypted with K pq and sent point-to-point to q. If the channel does not exist, then a Diffie-Hellman handshake protocol is used to securely agree on a key K pq between p and q. The channel is added to the cache, and m is encrypted with K pq and sent to q.
The cache has a very simple structure, using two rules: only connections to present group members are kept; and the cache is flushed every 24 hours 7 to prevent cryptanalysis.
To measure how expensive a Diffie-Hellman exchange is, we used a 500 Mhz Pentium III with 256 Mbytes of memory, running the Linux 2.2 OS for speed measurements. An exponentiation with a 1024-bit key using the OpenSSL cryptographic library was clocked at 40 milliseconds. Setting up a secure channel requires two messages containing 1024-bit 8 long integers, where both sides perform an exponentiation.
In light of this, we view the establishment of secure channels as expensive, in terms of both bandwidth and CPU. This is the rationale for caching connections at the SecChan layer.
Performance Assessment
In this section the performance of our security subsystem is described. Our testbed is a set of 20 Pentium III 500 Mhz Linux 2.2 machines, connected by a switched 10 Mbit/sec Ethernet. The machines were lightly loaded during testing, and the network was, for the most part, clear of other traffic. Throughput and latency were measured. Each measurement was taken three times; with a standard insecure stack (REG), with an authenticated stack (AUTH), and with an authenticated encrypted stack (SECURE). The encryption used was the default RC4.
Figure 1(a) shows the latency for a send/recv operation inside the stack. This is a "ping" test in which a message is received, and an immediate response is sent back to the origin. The amount of time spent inside the Ensemble stack is measured. As we show, the regular and authenticated stacks are quite close, meaning that the computational overhead of an MD5 hash over a message is not significant. On the other hand, the encrypted stack is relatively expensive. As message size grows, the computation required grows. For a 900-byte message the latency is 140 microseconds. Note that the baseline is a low and constant 24 microseconds. Hence, the basic overhead imposed by the system is very low. Furthermore, the cost difference among the different stacks is almost entirely due to the MAC and encryption algorithms, not to the layering structure.
Figure 1(b) shows the latency of a "request/response" scenario. Two machines using Ensemble are used. The initiating machine sends a point-to-point message to the second machine, which sends back an immediate response. This scenario was repeated 1,000 times, and various message sizes were used. A comparison with the UNIX ping utility was also included. As we can see, the difference among the three stacks is not very significant. Furthermore, the standard stack is fairly close to ping. We conclude that the latency is mostly due to the network and operating system. Figure 1(c) shows the throughput achievable in a lightly used network. The maximal bandwidth in a 10 Mbit/sec Ethernet is 1.2 Mbyte/sec. Out of the maximum, throughput of 750 Kbyte/sec can be achieved by a single sender for a 21-member group. The loss of bandwidth is attributed to the high level of guarantees provided. In order to achieve reliability, one must perform retransmissions; to achieve sender-order multicast, messages must be numbered; for flow-control, a back-off protocol must be used; and so on.
SECURE MERGE-THE EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
In the event of a network failure, a process group may become partitioned into several disjoint components, communication among which is impossible. Ensemble automatically elects a leader for each group component. Later, such a partitioned group may need to merge if communication is restored. Ensemble treats the former situation as the failures of one or more group members (the system does not distinguish communication failures to operational processes from process crashes). The system uses gossip messages to discover opportunities to merge a group.
More specifically, it is the responsibility of the Heal protocol, part of the standard Group Membership protocol, to discover partitioned group components. It is active at each group component leader. Each leader gossips a multicast IamAlive message periodically that includes its name and address. When a leader hears a remote leader from the same group, it initiates the merge sequence.
Group components cannot communicate with each other unless they possess the same key: only insecure gossip messages are allowed to pass through by the router. The Exchange layer uses these messages to achieve secure agreement on a mutual group key. The idea is that one of the components securely switches its key to that used by the other component. The Heal layer will activate the merge sequence after both components have the same key. The Exchange layer is active at each component leader acting as a filter of gossip messages. All outbound/inbound gossip messages pass through it.
While a merge protocol is taking place, components continue to distrust each other. It is possible that the merger is actually an attacker that is attempting to waste local computational resources, or attempting to maliciously modify the protocol and cause the system to crash. Therefore, the protocol should be as simple and foolproof as possible. Specifically, it should have these characteristics:
-Stateless: a component may engage in multiple authenticated key exchanges (AKEs) concurrently. Each such authenticated exchange is termed a session.
Since an attacker may engage in several sessions with an honest component, it is desirable not to keep per-session state;
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-No synchronized clocks: the protocol should not use synchronized clocks, since this requires some fault-tolerant clock synchronization service; and -No reliability: since we wish to avoid session-state, in particular we cannot use reliable messaging. This would require a numbering scheme for messages, and a retransmission mechanism. All messages sent in Exchange are gossip, unreliable messages.
Exchange is similar to the well-known Bellare-Rogaway authenticated key exchange scheme [Bellare and Rogaway 1993] . The article assumes that any two entities share a long-term symmetric key. The key is split into two pieces, one used for authentication, and the other for encryption. This allows exchanging authentic and encrypted session keys. Our settings do not admit agreed symmetric keys between entity pairs, hence, we use an authentication service to sign messages, and Diffie-Hellman exchanges [Diffie and Hellman 1976 ] to create encryption keys. First, we describe a naive version of the protocol, which is not resilient to replay attacks. Then, we enhance the protocol to handle such attacks.
Naive Version
The layer functions via the creation and recognition of three types of messages and headers. These are, for process p whose principal name 9 is R p , and whose view key is K p :
-Id: a header added to an outgoing gossip message. It contains R p . This header is cheap to create. -Ga, Gb: Point-to-point gossip messages that contain data to be sent securely to some process p. These messages are created by sealing the data for p. The header is expensive to generate, since its creation involves the authentication service, and it is usually long (currently about 1/2 Kbytes).
The layer maintains several constant fields: (1) the public 1024-bit prime modulos n, (2) a generator g for the finite field Z n , (3) a random value v ∈ Z n , chosen upon initialization, and (4) a precomputation of g v mod n. All members in G are initiated with the same values for n and g . We denote member s's value v by v s . The parameters n, g , v s are all chosen so that the Diffie-Hellman problem is hard.
The following event handlers are applied to gossip messages by process q, when q is leader of its component. The group key is part of the view-state; when the view change is complete new ke y will be installed at all the group's routers.
Note that the new key is encrypted with K q before being multicast as part of the view-state. Only members of q's component will be able to decrypt and install K p . Figure 2 describes an example run, where member p is the leader of component P with group key K p , and member q is the leader of component Q with group key K q . Member q receives p's IamAlive message, and initiates an authenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange, in which p hands over to q its component key K p .
In the example, members p and q keep secrets v p and v q , respectively. In general, each leader s keeps a random value v s ∈ Z n for which it precomputes g v s . This value is not revealed by distributing g v s , nor by raising it to the power of w ∈ Z n . This allows us to employ a single value v s for all sessions. To increase security v s can be switched periodically.
In order to reveal a group key K , the attacker can either: (1) break a DiffieHellman exchange in which K was transferred, or (2) discover some other group key K with which K was encrypted. The signature keys are not used to protect actual group keys. This allows using long-term signature keys, such as those afforded by public key infrastructures (PKIs). In this manner, Perfect Forward Secrecy is maintained.
• O. Rodeh et al. Note that messages may get lost in Exchange. While reliable key-exchange would be preferable to an unreliable one, this is sufficient for our purposes. For example, assume q loses p's last (third stage) message in the above example. Member q will be able to restart the protocol when it receives p's next IamAlive message. In other words, Exchange is reentrant.
Handling Replay Attacks
We now strengthen the protocol to handle replay attacks. The layer at member s keeps track of its local time in a variable lt s , and maintains a function f s (see below). The counter it lt s is a tuple containing the time since the beginning of the current view lt time s , and the unique identifier of the view (created by the system for internal reasons) lt vid s . The Bellare-Rogaway protocol requires using unpredictable nonces. In practice it is difficult to generate truly random numbers on a commodity PC without special hardware. Our poor man's alternative is to use the microsecond component of the local clock reading, and inflate it using cryptographically secure functions (MD5 and IDEA). Each member uses a secret inflation function f s that takes the local time and generates a 64-bit pseudo random value from it.
Below, we use the notation t s = (lt s , f s (lt s )). This means, for member s, a nonce created by concatenating the local time in s, it lt s , with f s (lt t ). The function f s is different for each member, and it is not revealed to other members.
The event handlers for member q, where q is a component leader, are:
-Onto each gossip message, add an Id header. We modify slightly the format of the message to: IamAlive(R q , t q ). -Upon receiving an Id(R p , t p ), if it is insecure, p is trusted, and R q < R p , 11 then create a message: Gb([q, p, t q , t p , g v q ] S qp ) and send it to p.
-Upon receiving a message Gb(. . .) from p, check that (1) the message is intended for p, (2) p is allowed to join, (3) the signature is correct, and (4) the nonce from q is fresh. If all conditions are true, then extract g v p and send back to p:
-Upon receiving a message Ga(. . . ) from p, check that: (1) the message is intended for q, (2) p is allowed to join, (3) the signature is correct, and (4) the nonce from q is fresh. If all conditions are true, then proceed as in the naive protocol.
A member must verify that a specific value t s = (l t s , z) was generated by itself at a time close to the current time. To verify this, member s checks that lt time s − l t time s < 10 seconds, 12 lt vid s == lt vid s , and z = f s (lt s ). This is a simple computation that only requires remembering f s . This was designed to allow avoiding any need for per-session state.
A final attack still seems possible: if p performs a successful exchange with q and accepts p's key K p , then retransmissions of the third message in the exchange will cause p to switch her key to K p . However, a successful exchange includes a view change, where the view-identifier is switched. Hence, old exchange messages will automatically be discarded.
Access Control Lists
In the above exposition, we have not discussed specific ACL considerations. Our AKE provides only a certain level of authorization checking. If leaders p and q are in each other's ACLs then components P and Q will merge. This assumes that the ACL is symmetric and transitive, that is, an equivalence relation. While it is possible to allow each member in P to check all members in Q, and vice versa, we have decided this is too expensive in terms of communication and computation.
The system allows applications to dynamically change their ACL; however, this may temporarily break the equivalence relation. For example, it is possible that, temporarily, member p trusts q, q trusts s, but p does not trust s. This may allow the creation of a group { p, q, s} where not all members trust one another. Therefore, care is required while changing ACLs. It is up to the application to make sure that the new ACLs form a consistent equivalence relation throughout the group.
While changing the ACL dynamically requires care, this capability is important when untrusted members need to be removed. For example, to remove member q, the group must perform the following steps: (1) switch its ACL to exclude q, (2) remove q from the group (the Ensemble API has an operation to that effect) and perform a view change without q, and (3) rekey so that q will not have the group key.
It is up to the application developer to make sure that the ACL is in fact an equivalence relation. While this may sound impractical, there are simple ways of implementing this. For example, the designer could employ a centralized authorization server, or simply a static ACL. Such an ACL must separate the list of trusted hosts into several disjoint subgroups. Trust is complete in each subgroup, but no member trusts members outside its subgroup. A more ambitious approach, guaranteeing ACL consistency, is to have the group leader maintain the ACL, and reliably multicast it whenever a change is required. Members send acknowledgments back to the leader; once all acknowledgments are received, rekeying can safely take place.
It is possible for two members p and q to decide they do not trust each other. In this case, the group will split into two components: one where all members trust p, and the other containing members trusting q.
It is assumed that an untrusted member does not use the short interval when it is still a group member to break group protocols and damage the group. Handling such faults entails the use of expensive Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols. It is assumed that group members cooperate to perform a common task, and are therefore trusted to behave correctly, including the case where they are removed from the group.
ACLs and Forward Confidentiality
The exchange protocol does not provide FCY. For example, in Figure 2 , member p sends to q its group key K P . This allows members of Q to decipher previous messages sent by members of P . It is possible to build a slight variation on the protocol that solves this problem, and guarantees FCY. The idea is to create a new key every time a merge sequence is started; see Figure 3 .
The problem with this variation is that it requires component P to switch its key to K N . This is a costly operation, especially since the merge is not guaranteed to succeed; hence, we may be blocking P and switching its key without gain.
Therefore, instead of guaranteeing FCY, we guarantee it only with respect to the ACL. Each time the application changes its ACL, it must also ask Ensemble to rekey. Henceforth, the exchange protocol will enforce this ACL, and prevent untrusted members from recovering the new key.
Since the common group membership operations are join and leave, one may suggest guaranteeing FCY efficiently only with respect to these operations. In case of merge or partition, confidentiality will require more effort. However, even if a single member p joins group G, it is required to switch the G's key so that p will not be able to recover past group messages. The dual situation occurs if p leaves G-the group key must be switched so that p will not be able to understand group messages henceforth. Hence, such an approach would not work in practice.
Note that the exchange protocol lacks key-independence. For example, when groups G 1 and G 2 with corresponding keys K 1 and K 2 merge, where G 2 changes its key to K 1 , new key K 1 is distributed encrypted by K 2 . The accompanying rekeying protocols are intended to remedy this situation. The user can choose to rekey after a merge, guaranteeing a fresh (independent) key for the group. 
EFFICIENT REKEYING
As we have argued above, a secure GCS must provide a means to switch the current group key. This requires efficient, low-latency, rekeying algorithms. Such, algorithms must provide effective handling for common scenarios: member join and leave.
We have designed and implemented several efficient rekeying protocols [Rodeh et al. 2000a,b] . In this section, we describe a particularly fast protocol that is designed for solving a specific case: a single member leave. We also show that its performance in the join case is on a par with, or even better than, previous results.
A rekeying layer uses services provided by other layers in the stack: pointto-point and multicast reliable communication, secure channels provided by SecChan, and the ability to prompt the stack to perform a view change.
The basic communication pattern of a rekeying protocol can be described using a very simple protocol, Basic, that we have studied elsewhere [Rodeh et al. 2000b] .
The Basic algorithm uses a simple method to rekey a group. The leader chooses a new key and disseminates it to the members using secure channels. The members send acknowledgments back to the leader. Once the leader receives acknowledgments from all the members, it performs a view-change, and installs the new key. Algorithm Basic is illustrated in Figure 4 . In the figure, and henceforth, a full arrowhead denotes a secure message, and an empty arrowhead denotes a clear-text message. Members are marked by simple numbers; for example, member p 5 is simply denoted by the number five.
A failure can occur during the run of Basic. In such a case, a view change will occur at all members, and they will all abort the protocol. The application can request a rekey in the new view.
Elsewhere, we have reported fairly fast rekeying times using a distributed version of the logical key hierarchy (LKH) family of algorithms [Wong et al. 1998; Wallner et al. 1998 ]. In principal, LKH uses a key distribution center (KDC) to disseminate a tree of keys to members of the group. The total number of keys is n, and each member has knowledge of log 2 n keys. This approach suffers from a single point of failure: if the KDC dies, the whole tree is lost.
• O. Rodeh et al. Our approach splits the KDC functionality evenly among the group members. In this scheme each member knows log 2 n keys, and no member knows all the keys. Thus, when a fault occurs, only log 2 n must be replaced. This can be performed quite efficiently [Rodeh et al. 2000a] . The new protocol is called dLKH; its performance is depicted in Figure 5 . Figure 5 describes a test performed on our set of 20 machines. To create groups larger than 20, several processes were run on the same machine. A large number of member join/leave operations were performed, and rekey times were clocked. To simulate real conditions, we flushed the cache once every 30 rekey operations, and discarded "cold-start" results. All of the tests described in this section were conducted in this manner.
What hampered protocol latency was the performance of local integer exponentiations. A member leave caused log 2 n Diffie-Hellman exchanges, which cost 80 ms each. The actual communication for a 30-member group was under 20 ms. The Diamond protocol is not based on a virtual tree concept; rather it attempts to make maximal usage of the current set of secure channels, employing it as an infrastructure for key dissemination.
The Diamond Protocol
The Diamond protocol is based on a graph where the nodes are group members, and the edges are secure channels that connect them. This graph describes the up-to-date status of connectivity between group members. In order to overcome a single failure, the graph should remain connected after a single failure; hence, it must be two-connected. The simplest method for building a two-connected graph for the group is to use a circle. Any node that is removed from the circle will leave it one-connected. Hence, it will be possible for the leader to choose a new key, and pass it to the remaining members without the need to create new secure channels. The problem with the circle structure is that it has diameter n/2. This will increase protocol latency. Hence, we require a structure that has logarithmic diameter.
We use a diamondlike graph. Four examples of such graphs are depicted in Figure 6 . Any diamond graph D has logarithmic diameter; it is defined recursively as follows.
-D has a First and Last element. A balanced diamond is one where the difference in height between the left and right sides is no more than two (similar to AVL trees). Balanced diamonds have an appealing property: their depth is guaranteed to be logarithmic. As we show later, the graph's depth defines the protocol's latency; hence, we would like to minimize it. The group connection graph is dynamic, since members join and leave. In particularly bad scenarios the graph can become unbalanced, with linear depth. To reduce depth, new edges can be added. However, we pay a significant computational price for each edge. Therefore, we rebalance the diamond graph, making maximal use of existing edges (see below).
First, we describe the general framework of the protocol and provide an example run. Then, we go into the details. The protocol is as follows. key K and sends it to its children. The last member in Q, when it receives K , multicasts a ProtoDone message.
• O. Rodeh et al. 5. Members that receive ProtoDone switch to the new key, and start sending messages again. They also rebuild the new diamond structure D new .
In Figure 7 an example with 10 members is depicted. The group results from the merging of three disjoint components { p 1 , p 2 , p 3 }, { p 4 , p 5 , p 6 }, and { p 7 , p 8 , p 9 , p 10 }. The representatives p 1 , p 4 , and p 7 send their graphs to p 1 . The leader, p 1 , computes Q, D new and multicasts them to G. The fast-graph Q is then used to rekey the group. Member p 10 starts the rekey process, it chooses a key and passes it securely to p 8 and p 9 . Members p 8 and p 9 pass the key down the graph. When p 1 receives messages from both p 2 and p 3 , it multicasts a ProtoDone message to the group. All members install the new key chosen by p 10 , and later engage in a protocol to build D new .
Note that we do not require explicit acknowledgments in our protocol. The last member in the diamond knows that all members have received the new key. This saves an additional ack-collection phase requiring another n−1 messages. In the above 10-member example, 12 messages are used. In general, a diamond contains no more than 4/3n edges (see the Appendix). This is close to optimal since any protocol communicating with all members must use at least n − 1 messages.
The new diamond structure is created after the new view has been installed. Structurally, it is a balanced two-connected diamond based on the set of existing connections. The members build all connections in the repaired diamond, in preparation of a future rekey request.
The quick schedule is used for a fast-rekey. In Figure 8 several examples are shown. The basic scheme for a 10-member group is shown in Example (a). Member p 10 chooses a new key and passes it to its children p 9 and p 8 . The new key is passed down the graph until p 1 receives keys from both p 2 and p 3 . To improve this schedule, we show how some of the secure messages can be turned into clear-text acknowledgments. Note that p 1 receives the key from two different sources: p 2 and p 3 . The second key is superfluous; an ack from p 3 to p 1 can be sent instead. In Example (b) we show how three secure messages can be saved.
Examples (c) and (d) describe two cases of a single member leave. We must be careful not to create new channels in this case. Note that in case (c) there is no channel between p 6 and p 7 . In case (d) there is no channel between p 8 and p 9 . In case (e), member p 10 rejoins the group. The key is passed to p 10 from p 8 , instead of from both p 8 and p 9 ; this reduces the number of required new channels to one (this is optimal).
The performance we gained using this structure is two orders of magnitude better than what we were able to achieve using previous approaches. See Figure 9 for performance measurements.
Balanced Diamonds
The connection graph after joins and merges occur may not be connected. It is the task of the balancing algorithm to forge a diamond graph out of existing edges, and add as few new edges as possible. Furthermore, it is entrusted with balancing the graph such that its depth is logarithmic.
The procedure followed when creating a balanced diamond is comprised of two stages: reconnection and rebalancing.
• O. Rodeh et al. To make sure that D new is two-connected we apply a recursive procedure, Fix, to D new .
Procedure Fix:
-If D has one member, then do nothing.
-If D has two or more members, we must put it into canonical form. In canonical form, a diamond has both a First and a Last member. Assume, for example, that D has only a Last member. If Last fails, then D will be cut off from the rest of the graph. To complete First and Last, if they do not exist, we steal (see below) members from the larger of the subdiamonds Left and Right.
The Fix algorithm uses a node-stealing technique. When a node is taken from a diamond structure D, one should cause the least damage to D. It is generally difficult to decide which node makes the best choice. Our heuristic is to take an inner node, that is, a node that is not a top or bottom node in any diamond. Such nodes are members in only two edges, whereas top and bottom nodes are connected by three.
The Fix procedure ensures that each sub diamond of D new is one-connected. However, this is not enough. It is still possible that D new will have a First, Last, and Left, but no Right. This would make it only one-connected. Therefore, we make sure that D new has non empty Left and Right. This ensures that the whole graph is two-connected.
Once D new is two-connected, we can rebalance it. In the balance stage we recursively examine D new . For each diamond D we check the height difference between the left and right sides. If this difference is greater than two, then we apply a balance step; see Figure 10 . This step involves the creation of two new graph edges. Since this is relatively expensive, we apply balancing only at extreme situations.
5.2.1 Performance. To measure the performance of the balancing algorithm, we measured the number of exponentiations performed on average Fig. 10 . A rebalancing step. Diamond R is much smaller than L. We then move it down and merge it with LR. The dotted lines denote new edges. during the reconstruction phase. Figure 11 depicts the number of exponentiations as a function of the number of members.
For the join case, there are just under two operations performed on average. The nodes in the tree have degrees varying between two and three. Generally, there are more degree-three nodes than degree-two nodes. In the usual join case, no rebalancing is required, and the total number of channels that require building is between two and three. This is split into the quick phase and the reconstruction phase. In the quick phase, a bit more than one channel is created. The optimum is a single new channel, since that would suffice to pass a fresh new key to the joiner. In the reconstruction phase, we can see that about 1.6 exponentiations are performed.
In the leave case, more complex tree operations are required, since many times, a leave breaks tree connectivity. The removal of a degree-three node necessitates moving a different member into its place. In this case, we are interested in the minimization of work. We can see that about three exponentiations are performed on average.
• O. Rodeh et al. 
RELATED WORK
Ensemble is a direct descendent of three systems: Isis , Horus [Renesse et al. 1996] , and Transis [Amir et al. 1992] . Early work on group communication security was performed in Horus [Reiter et al. 1992 . Our work extends the Horus security architecture but differs in many ways. We added support for multiple partitions (the secure version of Horus permitted progress only in the primary partition), group rekey upon demand, application-defined security policies, and plugged in off-the-shelf authentication systems.
Many other GCSs have been built around the world. The secure GCSs that we know of are: Antigone [McDaniel et al. 1999] , Spread [Amir et al. 2000] , Totem [Moser et al. 1996; Kihlstrom et al. 1998 ], and Rampart [Reiter 1994 ]. Spread splits the GCS functionality into a server and client sides. Protection, in the form of a shared encryption and MAC key, is offered to the client while the server is left unprotected. Access control is not supported. The shared group key is created using the Cliques cryptographic toolkit [Steiner et al. 1998 ]. Cliques uses contributed shares from each member to create the group key. Cliques's keys are stronger than our own, providing FCY, BCY, and key independence. However, they require substantially more computation, in the form of between 1 and log n Diffie-Hellman exponentiations per member for a join/leave operation.
Antigone has been used to secure video conferences over the Web, using the VIC and VAT tools. In Antigone, the issues of group ACLs, and the trade-off between security and performance when groups are large, and members join and leave often were studied. However, to date, it has not been provided with a fault tolerance architecture.
Rampart [Reiter 1994 ] is a group communication system built in AT&T which is resistant to Byzantine attacks. Up to a third of the members in a Rampart group may behave in a Byzantine manner yet the group would still provide reliable multicast facilities. A system providing similar guarantees has been built at the University of Santa Barbara in California [Kihlstrom et al. 1998 ]. Byzantine security is rather costly, however, and it is difficult to develop applications resistant to such faults. We chose not to support such a fault model in Ensemble.
The Enclave system [Gong 1997 ] allows a set of applications to create a shared security context in which secure communication is possible. All multicast communication is encrypted and signed using a symmetric key. The security context is managed by a member acting as leader. Security is afforded to any application implementing the Enclave API. The Enclave system addresses the security concerns of a larger set of applications than our own; however, faulttolerance is not addressed. Should the group-leader fail, the shared security context is lost and the group cannot recover.
The Cactus system [Hiltunen and Schlichting 1996] is a framework allowing the implementation of network services and applications. A Cactus application is typically split into many small layers (or microprotocols), each implementing a specific functionality. Cactus has a security architecture [Hiltunen et al. 2000] that allows switching encryption and MAC algorithms as required. Actual microprotocols can be switched at run-time as well. This allows the application to adapt to attacks, or changing network conditions at run-time.
Of all systems, ours is closest to Reiter's security architecture for Horus . Horus is a group communication system sharing much of the characteristics of Ensemble. The system followed the fortress security model, where a single partition was allowed, and members could join and leave the group, protected by access control and authentication barriers. Group members share a symmetric group key used to encrypt and MAC all inner group messages. Furthermore, the system allocated public keys for groups that clients could use to perform secure group-RPC. Horus was built at a time when authentication services were not standard, therefore, it included a secure time service, and a replicated Byzantine fault-tolerant authentication service. Symmetric encryption was optimized through the generation of one-time-pads in the background.
By comparison, our system uses off-the-shelf authentication services, it does not handle group-RPC, and symmetric encryption is not a bottleneck. In Ensemble we handle the "next tier" of issues: supporting efficient group merge (not just join and leave), allowing multiple partitions (not just primary partition), and efficient group rekeying with FCY.
The secure IP multicast community is also interested in group key management, although their focus is on very large-scale groups. The Secure Multicast Group (SMuG) has defined several problem areas [Hardjono and Tsudik 1999; Hardjono et al. 2000 ]: (1) data handling (source authentication, and data encryption), (2) secure and scalable group key management, and (3) group policy.
Basic work on group key management was performed in Ballardie [1996] Harney and Muckenhirn [1997a,b] and Mittra [1997] . These papers describe the management of session keys for (very) large groups, such that the infrastructure required is scalable and efficient. Recent work [Wallner et al. 1998; Wong et al. 1998 ] has suggested using a Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) for rekeying large groups. In LKH, a logical key hierarchy rooted at a key-server is created. The key-server opens secure channels with all group members and disseminates group subkeys to group subsets. To remove a member, all keys known to that member must be discarded, and replacement keys are chosen in their place. Storage space at the server is O(n), at the client it is O(log n), and message size for removing/adding a member is O(log n). Improvements to LKH were suggested in Balenson et al. [1999] and Canetti et al. [1999a] , and optimal bounds were derived in Canetti et al. [1999b] and Poovendran and Baras [1999] . Work on policy for large-scale groups has been described in McDaniel et al. [1999 ] Johnston et al. [1998 , and Harney et al. [2001] .
IP multicast is concerned mainly with one-to-many multicast, where a single application multicasts to many clients whose membership is dynamic and not necessarily known (so called M − N situations are also discussed). Ensemble is concerned mainly with many-to-many multicasts where any member may multicast to the group and where membership is known. In secure IP multicast, trusted centralized servers may be used to disseminate group keys; in Ensemble, which possesses a completely distributed architecture, no such single point of failure is allowed. Ensemble leaves it up to the user to specify group policy, while providing efficient tools for enforcement.
Our diamond-rekeying protocol touches on the field of fault-tolerant communication graphs, for example, Dwork et al. [1988 ] Bruck et al. [1997 and Harary [1962] . However, work in that field has mostly been oriented towards static networks, where nodes and links can fail, but not recover, and new nodes and links cannot be created on the fly. This is the major difference between our work and other work in the field. An interesting open question is to extend our work to tolerate more than a single failure.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work we consider configurations of hundreds of members, and further assume that member trust policies are symmetric and transitive.
Under these assumptions, we have developed a security architecture for Ensemble, which supports multiple partitions (not just primary partition), group rekeying upon demand, application-specific security policies, and off-theshelf authentication. Our software is freely available as part of the Ensemble project.
APPENDIX A. Computing the Number of Edges in a Diamond
The maximal number of edges in a diamond is achieved when the diamond is "full." This means that there are no holes, and it contains the maximal number of nodes possible for its depth. If we denote the number of edges as a function of the number of members by e(n) then: e(n) = 4 + 2 * e(n/2 − 1). This is justified by: (1) the first and last members have a total of 4 edges to members in the left and right subdiamonds and (2) the subdiamonds are full, hence, they have an equal number of edges.
To figure out what the function e(n) looks like, we use our recursive equation:
e(n) = 4 + 2 * e(n/2 − 1) and add knowledge about the values of e(n) for small n. First, we complete e to a continuous derivable function on the field of real numbers. We derive both sides of the equation and get:
e (x) = 2 * e (x/2 − 1) * (1/2) e (x) = e (x/2 − 1). This can only occur with a function whose derivative is constant. Hence, e is a linear function. e(n) = an + b.
We know that e(4) = 4 e(10) = 12.
We conclude that e(n) = 4/3n − 4/3. This shows that the number of edges in a diamond graph is small. In fact, it is close to the number of edges of a circle.
